How do authoritarian rulers legitimate repressive actions against their own citizens? Even in autocracies with limited accountability, discursive justifications are often put forward to decrease the costs of domestic repression. Although the research depicts state repression as the opposite of legitimation, justified coercion against some groups may generate legitimacy in the eyes of other parts of the population. This paper conceptualises the suggested links between legitimation and repression. It studies the justifications of mass killings by integrating framing theory with recent research on the domestic and international dimensions of authoritarian rule. Given the common threats at the global level and the diffusion of repressive tactics, we assume that discursive justifications of repression in authoritarian regimes change over time, probably due to learning processes. We compare Egypt and Uzbekistan to analyse the government rhetoric in the Rabi'a and Ferghana Valley protest crackdowns, respectively, taking into account the audiences of the framing and the sources of the frames that justify repression.
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GIGA Working Papers repression. Besides lowering the cost of repression, justified repression may, in some instances, even serve the purpose of creating legitimacy. From an empirical perspective, legitimacy is not an absolute value shared by the whole population, but rather an empirically observable relation between the ruler and the ruled; therefore, different societal groups may assess regime legitimacy in different ways. Although state repression is often depicted as the opposite of legitimation, coercive actions may serve to generate legitimacy in the eyes of certain segments of the population or international actors.
This paper presents a conceptualisation of the suggested links between legitimation and repression, focusing on discursive justifications and their audiences. Such justifications may be inspired by globalised discourses and targeted at international audiences beyond the domestic public. Recent studies on diffusion among and cooperation between authoritarian regimes have highlighted the international dimensions of authoritarian rule, demonstrating that cooperation between authoritarian regimes and learning processes are rational mechanisms.
Our theoretical approach integrates recent research on the domestic and international dimensions of authoritarian rule with insights from framing theory. We hypothesise that the addressees of legitimation discourses extend beyond domestic audiences to the international sphere. How are repressive policies justified? Who do they repress, and to whom are they justified? We examine the Uzbek and Egyptian governments' rhetoric during and after the two brutal repressive crackdowns of Andijon in 2005 and Rabi'a 'Adawiya Square in 2013.
These were extreme instances of high-intensity coercion, often described as massacres, which were highly visible and thus necessitated public justification. 2 After presenting the frames used by regime elites to legitimise the repression of domestic protest movements, we contrast these findings with the legitimation discourse concerning other targets of repression, as well as with repression in earlier times. The empirical analysis then investigates whether the justification of the repressive policy is a result of international or regional influences, alongside the domestic factors that have proven important in shaping legitimation discourses. In the final sections, we compare the two case studies and consider the results' repercussions for the theoretical considerations we have proposed.
Concept

How Does Justification Work? Introducing Framing Theory into Autocracy Research
When the security apparatus turns against certain groups, state representatives often present the target to the public as a threat. In analysing such political communication, framing theorywhich is applied in a variety of social sciences, especially media studies, communications, cognitive psychology, and collective action theory -can be useful. Thus, "frames select and call attention to particular aspects of the reality described" (Entman 1993: 54) . According to Snow and Benford (1988) , the core framing tasks are "diagnostic framing," "prognostic framing," and "motivational framing." 3 While in political science, framing theory is often applied to analyse social movements, we contribute to the literature centred on governmental frames. Framing approaches have often been used to study discourses in democracies, but some recent works also deal with authoritarian framing (e.g. Jourde 2007; Bondes and Heep 2013; Wooden 2014) . Although in authoritarian regimes it is easier to convey certain messages due to censorship and controlled media, this does not automatically predict the results of the framing process. It is crucial to take into account that "frames do not have a single, universal effect" on the recipients (Watson 2012: 298) . The framing of repression can have legitimising or delegitimising and deterrent or mobilising effects, depending on the target audience.
To refine our approach, we include two insights from the more recent research on securitisation. First, audiences in autocracies do not necessarily comprise all the citizens of a state. Instead, it may be the elite, or strategically important groups, to whom a security issue is communicated (Vuori 2008: 72) . Second, securitising moves may also legitimise actions ex post (ibid.: 85). The framing and securitisation research strands are closely connected, and some efforts at integrating them have already been made (Carvalho Pinto 2014; Watson 2012) . Our main tool is framing theory, into which we include security as one master frame alongside others, as Watson proposes (2012: 281) , to account for the higher level of abstraction within framing theory. According to Snow and Benford (1992) , master frames are flexible and open to extension and the inclusion of more specific issue frames. 4
Types of Discursive Justification
The justification of repression has rarely been studied by political scientists; nonetheless, we embed some insights from the previous literature in our conceptualisation. Hess and Martin (2006) list different tactics for precluding public outrage after repression, such as blaming the victims or labelling repression as self-defence. Roscigno et al. (2015) study how US agencies justified the massacre of the Sioux at Wounded Knee in 1890 by framing the group's practices as a cultural threat. Alex Dukalskis investigates popular protests in China in 1989 , Myanmar in 2007 , and Iran in 2009 -2010 and finds that protesters were blamed as criminals for inciting disorder and for being manipulated by foreigners and "not committed to the regime's vision of legitimacy," whereas the security forces and their role in preserving public order were honoured. He thus concludes that authoritarian incumbents "attempt to endorse that repres-3 As this paper is more concerned with the narratives than with their effects, we focus on the former two tasks.
4 As with other frames, master frames are expected to resonate and thus "work" when they are empirically credible, commensurate with the audience's experience, and ideationally central (Snow and Benford 1992: 140-141).
299/2017 GIGA Working Papers sion in ways consistent with their legitimating messages" (Dukalskis 2015: 32) . To describe how legitimating messages in authoritarian regimes work more generally, March posits that "[t]he main strategy is to define the entire state in relation to common goals, to define the goals and aspirations as virtually constitutive of the nation as such, and to equate the regime with the proper articulation and realization of those goals through the state apparatus" (March 2003: 229) .
A variety of goals or values can be invoked to justify repression. Among the discursive justifications of repression and state violence, two broad directions are distinguishable: 5
(1) social control, through "conservative" frames that focus on stability and security, and (2) social change, with repression framed as necessary for "progress." From the perspective of framing theory, these two can be understood as "master frames." The justifications referring to social change are mainly used in politicised societies where ideologies, especially leftist and communist ones, are important, and/or in early phases of regime establishment that necessitate mass mobilisation. In most of the currently existing authoritarian regimes, personalised rule has been around for a while and is thus rather conservative and demobilising in its strategies. We therefore expect justifications referring to social control and stability to dominate.
The master diagnostic frame can be understood as "endangered status quo." Governments frame activities by opponents as "harmful behaviour" threatening the status quo. instead the values are situated on a more permanent level such as the nation or society, as hypothesised by March (2003) . The values range from state-related arguments such as national unity, legality, security, stability, and public order to more cultural or social aspects such as societal cohesion and tradition.
In an empirical study, the first task is to detect the frames used. On the basis of a categorisation, changes over time can be detected. Scartozzi's (2015) evaluation of Assad's shifts in "strategic narratives" between 2011 and 2014 can serve as an example here.
5 In addition to discursive justifications, procedural justifications of repression exist. For example, the judicial process of a trial can be a justification for a dissident's repression. At other times, repression costs are reduced through clandestine actions rather than justification (see Edel 2016) .
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Targets of Repression and (Its) Legitimation
What the different strands of literature presented above have in common is the importance of targets. In framing theory, the question of resonance, which depends on the perspective of frame recipients, is paramount. In the research on authoritarian regimes, legitimation is viewed as a relational category involving the necessity of legitimacy claims being accepted by target groups. Bank (2004) and Josua (forthcoming) consider, in particular, the difference between strategies directed towards elites and those directed towards the broader population or different societal groups. In their study of repression, Mason and Krane (1989) introduced the useful differentiation of targets according to their numbers and their levels of activism.
In considering the audience for the legitimation of repression, it is the targets of legitimation strategies that matter. On the one hand, there is the domestic audience, which can consist of particular groups, such as the regime base, that are subject to selective legitimation attempts or of virtually the entire population, which is subject to broader strategies. On the other hand, various actors at the international level might play a role -for example, neighbouring states and the international community as well as regional and international organisations or diaspora populations. Additionally, the targets of repression need to be considered, as this is crucial for the framing a government can use. The discriminatory or indiscriminate application of repression is an important factor for understanding its effects, which In addition, both the international and the domestic context are not only (potential) addressees of justification but often also inspire elites. At the international level, discourses on human rights and democracy have become salient, while at both the regional and the international levels repressive tactics and their discursive justifications have diffused.
In recent years, a general trend of talking about terrorism and stepping up repression has been witnessed worldwide. This discourse has diffused, shifting the repertoires of authoritarian leaders, consciously or unconsciously, towards less democratic window-dressing and more self-confident assertions of their power. Therefore, we expect changes, and probably also learning processes (Levy 1994) , in authoritarian regimes' legitimation discourses. The recent literature on authoritarian learning argues that learning processes are facilitated by international linkages -in a modification of Way and Levitsky's democracy-centred conceptthat optimise repression (Leenders 2016; Heydemann and Leenders 2014 The cases differ with respect to the regime phase during which the repression incidents occurred: In Egypt, a new post-coup military regime tried to get rid of the former incumbents, while in Uzbekistan, Karimov had ruled for 16 years. One can hypothesise that depending on the regime phase, justifications for repression will differ. Furthermore, the repression literature suggests that the expertise of elites and the history of cooperation between a state's security organisations will influence repressive patterns (Davenport 2007; Pereira 2005) . In Uzbekistan, the security services are most prominent, in part due to their roots in the KGB, whereas in Egypt in 2013, directly after the coup, the military was dominant.
We use a paired comparison with the aim of developing new hypotheses that elucidate the justification of repression. Our qualitative analysis of discourses draws on publicly available sources such as scholarly works, newspaper articles, blogs, and reports. We have exam-299/2017 GIGA Working Papers ined public statements made by officials before and in the aftermath of violent protests to extract the justifications presented to the public. The laws according to which protesters were prosecuted and the accusations made in court also offer insights as to how repression was justified, and are complemented by information on legal proceedings in the case of arrest and subsequent trial. This allows us to capture both the justification of repression proper and the engineered narratives about events more broadly.
Empirical Analysis
In the following, we first describe the repression in the most relevant episodes of high-intensity coercion in Egypt in 2013 and Uzbekistan in 2005 and outline the frames that regime elites used to legitimise it. We then contrast these findings with the legitimation discourse on other targets of repression and in former times. Finally, we relate the justifications of the repressive policies to domestic and international sources and addressees.
Egypt
Repression of the Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has had a mixed history in its relations with the Egyptian peaceful civilians, shooting and in part even burning an estimated 1,000 people to death. 6
Many protesters were arrested. The Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed in September and declared a terrorist organisation in December 2013, in what was just the beginning of the repression that has since drastically narrowed the public sphere and heavily affected the media, NGOs, and universities. Army commander-in-chief and coup leader al-Sisi tightened his grip on power and was elected president in May 2014.
Justification of Repression
The main narrative the new government brought forward was that the Rabi'a 'Adawiya
Square protesters consisted only of Muslim Brotherhood supporters, who acted violently and amounted to terrorists. In addition, the disruption of daily life and public order were contrasted with the security of state and citizens. Then-prime minister Beblawi "justified the use of force saying that Morsi loyalists had been sowing chaos around the country, 'terrorising citizens, attacking public and private property'" (Daily News Egypt, 14 November 2013).
He stressed "the spread of anarchy and attacks on hospitals and police stations" (The Economic Times, 15 August 2013).
One justification strategy was to depict the police forces as defending their own lives as well as the state and its institutions. Therefore, the number of policemen killed was highlighted and probably exaggerated, while the number of victims among the protesters was downplayed. Arguments of self-defence were employed, with protesters accused of having shot first. Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim explained that the police forces "were surprised by protesters who started firing live ammunition" and added that "'clear instructions'
were given to security forces to limit use of weapons to teargas after protesters had been told to leave by loudspeakers" (Ahram Online, 15 August 2013). 7
Framing protests as terrorism is a tried and tested narrative from the "war on terror."
Even before the peak of the crackdown, on 24 July, al-Sisi had asked "all honest and trustworthy Egyptians" to "come out to give me the mandate and order that I confront violence and potential terrorism" (The Guardian, 24 July 2013). During a news conference on 17 August, presidential adviser Mostafa Hegazy said, "We are facing a war launched by extremist forces escalating every day to a terrorist war" (Al Jazeera English, 17 Aug 2013). During the broadcasting of his statement, the headline "Egypt fighting terrorism" was visible on screen.
6 Prime Minister Hazem Beblawi spoke of a death toll "close to 1,000" in Rabi'a 'Adawiya Square and Nahda
Square together, and the National Council for Human Rights counted 624 civilians plus eight policemen killed in Rabi'a Square. Other estimates are higher, including Human Rights Watch figures. The organisation has stated that "a minimum of 817 people and more likely at least 1,000" persons were killed (HRW 2014).
7 However, the discourse on this issue was not consistent among all officials and at all times. Furthermore, according to the Interior Ministry's planning of the forceful dispersal, the death of some thousand protesters was expected beforehand (HRW 2014). we'd rather die before Egyptians are terrorized" (Al-Jazeera English, 26 March 2014).
Besides the frame of terrorism, the reference to a legal basis for repression seems to be vital in the justification of such measures. While the violent crackdown was still ongoing, government representatives declared that the crisis was being handled via "security measures within the framework of law" (Al Jazeera English, 17 August 2013). Later on, al-Sisi referred to the rule of law and non-interference with judicial processes when questioned on his country's human rights record (Washington Post, 12 March 2015) . Because depicting repressive measures as being in accordance with legislation seems to be a priority, it comes as no surprise that since Mursi's ouster, a strategy of judicialising repression has been pursued (Grimm 2015: 2) . Most important among these initiatives are the 2013 protest law, the antiterror legislation, and the new constitution. As with other cases of authoritarian legislation, they are formulated in vague language and offer new regulations for judges to apply in unfair trials, as well as legalising administrative sanctions by police and military forces. 9
Other Targets and Justification in Former Times
Harsh repression accompanied by a security and terrorism discourse is not a new phenomenon in Egypt. During the wave of repression against the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1990s its Since the coup, the discourse centring on terrorism, security, and extremism has become a cover to justify not only the repression of MB activists but the entire crackdown, which has hit the whole spectrum from Islamists to the liberal opposition, the media, and NGOs. All ac- 
Justification in the Domestic and International Contexts
Egypt's Islamist opposition has, as a whole, previously experienced periods of harsh repression, especially after the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, when members of the jihadist group that plotted to kill him were executed, and in the so-called civil war of the 1990s. The pattern of first initiating a crackdown, then rhetorically introducing certain narratives before introducing legislation to convict the defendants of terrorism and holding trials against them in military courts was already existent in the 1990s.
Within the international context, the Egyptian military has had ample opportunity to cooperate with the United States on domestic counterterrorism in recent years. These experiences have certainly contributed to framing the country's main concerns as extremism and terrorism. Egypt has stepped up this discourse on the international stage, as is apparent from its speeches to the UN General Assembly, where these topics now make up the lion's share as opposed to the buzzwords of stability and peace that were typical in the 1990s and the first decade of this century.
The intensified use of terrorism rhetoric also appears to be a result of diffusion and learning processes. A successful terrorism discourse has taken place in Syria, where Bashar alAssad has partially convinced the international audience of the opposition's terrorist nature, not least by influencing domestic circumstances to prompt a shift towards more extremism.
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Given such examples, where even the fiercest repression can find some cover under a terrorism discourse, combined with domestic experiences and the general impression of the worldwide discursive success of the terrorism narrative, it is no wonder that the interim military government took up this frame to justify the Rabi'a massacre. 10 Both discourses, directed towards the domestic audience and the international audience, have used the frames "security," "order," and "terrorism" to a large extent. However, in the first months after the crackdown, "legality" was more prominent. This is reflected in the government's rhetorical support for investigations of the incidents, and in the emphasis placed on the adherence to law in discussions with Western media, especially by Prime Minister Hazem
Beblawi. However, even in media channels directed mainly towards Western audiences, the focus on terrorism became larger over time. In March 2015, al-Sisi stressed the dangers of terrorism and state collapse, and offered his interpretation of the Muslim Brotherhood: "The Muslim Brotherhood is the parent organization of extreme ideology. They are the godfather of all terrorist organizations. They spread it all over the world" (Washington Post, 12 March 2015).
Uzbekistan
Repression under Karimov
Ever since independence in 1991, Uzbekistan has adopted a sceptical stance towards religion, in particular Islam, in spite of a rich cultural heritage that has been partly appropriated by official discourse. President Karimov feared that pan-Islamic tendencies would threaten the citizens' loyalty towards the state, and religious organisations have thus faced tight restrictions, forcing them underground (Ilkhamov 2001: 42) . Non-official versions of Islam are referred to interchangeably as "political Islam," "extremism," "Islamism," "Salafism," "radicalism," "Wahhabism," and "Jihadism" (Peyrouse 2016: 2) , and such labelling has even extended to Protestant Christians (ibid.: 4).
In the 1990s, a militant Islamist movement, the were charged with being members of the Akromiya. The trial was monitored by 1,000 to 4,000 people outside, an unusual gathering of people. 12 On the last day of the proceedings, the judges announced that the defendants would be imprisoned indefinitely without a verdict. Enraged family members and friends stormed the prison and freed them and others during the night. The group joined protesters in occupying the regional administration building in Bobur Square on 13 May and publicly denounced social and political injustice.
Throughout the day, snipers and security forces from all branches mowed down hundreds of protesters, perhaps even a thousand. 13 Citizens from Andijon who tried to flee to the nearby Kyrgyz border were met with gunfire by Uzbek guards (RFE/RL, 14 November 2005).
According to some sources, the military and intelligence agencies took over functions from the Ministry of Interior, assuming control of its anti-terror units, and indicating a power struggle from which the intelligence service emerged victoriously (Burnashev and Chernykh 2007: 71) . 14 The EU and US reacted by imposing sanctions, which led to a swift realignment with Russia through intensified collaboration in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (ibid.: 72). As a sign of goodwill, the death penalty was abolished in 2008, although severe and occasionally lethal torture continues to this day.
The number of political prisoners is currently estimated at approximately 10,000.
Justification of Repression
The Uzbek government's primary justification for the Andijon repression was that it was acting in defence of the population against armed criminals. Karimov accused the protesters of using women and children as human shields. The main narrative focused on Islamism, which was becoming increasingly embedded in the global discourse on the war on terror. In a press conference on 14 May, the president blamed the Akromiya for the events and portrayed it as Hizb ut-Tahrir's local branch, although the two movements have no connection.
Karimov drew a parallel to the unrest ensuing after the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan two months before, insisting on the existence of foreign funding and the participation of foreigners seeking to establish a "Muslim Caliphate" (Karimov 2005) . Intercepted phone calls from protesters to Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan were cited as proof of international connections (ibid.). Later, the Foreign Ministry added the IMU to the list of suspects (Registan, 17 May 12 As all information about the Akromiya as an organised body goes back to non-public sources the government presented in court rather than authentic material, the group's existence is questionable (Kendzior 2006 The government wanted to transmit its own reading of events to an external audience. It pursued a sophisticated approach, with the Uzbek Embassy in the United States distributing a video in support of the government narrative to think tank scholars in an effort to win over Western academics. However, parts of this "documentary" were also used inside Uzbekistan in a propaganda video that was frequently broadcast on television in the summer of 2005 (Kendzior 2006: 546) . Journalists and human rights activists whose accounts of the Andijon events deviated from the official story were defamed and persecuted as supporters of international terrorism. Independent news websites were shut down in order to erase alternative narratives as part of a carefully orchestrated "information black-out" intended to enforce the official version (Moore 2007: 315) .
While in the first press conference after the Andijon events Karimov did not directly accuse the protesters of being terrorists themselves, over time the official rhetoric shifted towards this terminology and the judicial accusations were based on the anti-terror legislation, which is vague enough to prosecute dissenters (Megoran 2008: 20) . In court, the charges filed against arrested activists included "terrorism, attacking the constitutional order, murder, the organization of a criminal band, mass disturbances, the taking of hostages, and illegal pos- The defendants were not able to obtain their verdicts, rendering them unable to appeal (Fergananews 27 February 2006) . In addition to journalists, poets who wrote songs about the massacre were arrested for insulting the president (Kendzior 2007: 325 f.) . Two citizens who possessed a cassette with the song were handed even harsher sentences.
Not all repression was justified. The government downplayed the number of citizens killed to 187, well below the estimates from other sources of between 600 and 1,000 victims.
Moreover, Karimov insisted that "'not one peaceful citizen'" had been shot (Kendzior 2007: 317), especially not women and children. Witnesses reported that dead women and children were hidden from the public and that only male victims were made available for identification in the makeshift morgues (BBC, 17 May 2005) . Justifications of repression reached their limits when it came to obviously innocent victims.
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Other Targets and Justification in Former Times
Already in 2000, members of the political opposition were tried on charges of terrorism, as anti-terror legislation had been introduced early on in Karimov's rule. The legal basis "defined terrorism as 'socially dangerous wrong doing' while Article 244 of its Criminal Code draws together in its proscription 'the activities of religious organisations, movements, sects and others which support terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime'" (Horsman 2005: 201) . The definition sees terrorism even in ideological goals, such as the future establishment of a caliphate, without the exertion of violence (ibid.: 202).
Lumping different dissenting groups together is a trademark of Karimov's writings, where the words "opposition" and "radical" are usually used together "as if to suggest that [...] all opposition is by definition radical" (March 2003: 224) . While terrorists allegedly underwent training abroad as early as 1995 (Horsman 2005: 203) , in Karimov's 1997 book terrorism did not figure as prominently as religious fundamentalism (Karimov 1997 ).
The judicial system "has always identified political opposition as a criminal conspiracy 
Justification in the Domestic and International Contexts
To a large extent, the justification pattern used after the Andijon events picked up on previous discourses. While the Uzbek government has always employed a tough approach towards
Islamists, it enhanced its embryonic anti-terror discourse and even exploited it on the international scene after 9/11 to receive financial support. After the 2004 attacks, the government referred to the perpetrators as representing "jamoats," which can be read as a reference to Egypt's Gamaa Islamiyya, which fought the Egyptian government in a civil war during the 299/2017 GIGA Working Papers 1990s and later joined, in part, al-Qaeda. This was a deliberate framing directed at the international community "with US backing for Egypt's 'war on terrorism' in mind" (Ilkhamov 2004 ).
The West was an important addressee, if not the main one, of this discourse. Indeed, Western partners took the alleged presence of Islamists seriously and supported Uzbekistan's anti-terror fight for geostrategic reasons. The international interest in a "stable" neighbour for Afghanistan diminished the danger of external criticism (Omelicheva 2007: 385) . In general, the global war on terror has become a convenient blueprint for justifying state violence ( One primary goal of the increased repression in 2005 was diffusion-proofing, to avoid the colour revolutions that had taken other former USSR states by surprise. Neighbouring Kyrgyzstan had been the latest and closest country where unrest had spread from disgruntled communities and "resulted in the president's decision to vacate office" (Koesel and Bunce 2013: 759) . Thus, in his above-mentioned press conference, Karimov (2005) took pains to refute any similarity with the colour revolution protests, to the point of denying that people had assembled in a square. The president was trying to learn from others' failures in this case.
The Uzbek approach towards terrorism is, according to Horsman, rooted in its Soviet legacy. Horsman cites the "ideological and arbitrary definition of terrorism, the 'criminalisation' of the terrorist, the portrayal of vast and usually externally inspired conspiracies against the state and the call for popular mobilisation against the threat," as well as the court trials, GIGA Working Papers 299/2017 as displaying similarities to the 1930s (Horsman 2005: 208) . This could be a result of political socialisation, as Karimov was the final Communist Party first secretary in Uzbekistan.
Comparative Evaluation
Similarities and Differences in Frame Contents
The most striking similarities in the frames used in Egypt and Uzbekistan are the references to violent behaviour and terrorism. In both cases, the claim that the opponents were armed criminals who had fired before the security forces opened fire was central. The danger to security figured prominently, and the ascription of terrorism was extended to justify the repression of civilians who were not only unarmed, but also definitely not Islamists.
Interestingly, in both countries the terrorism frame gained importance over time, rendering it the most popular ex post legitimation of repression. In Uzbekistan, terrorism was not even mentioned in Karimov's first press conference on Andijon, but it subsequently became one of the major accusations in the trials and the surrounding discourse. In Egypt, the framing of terrorists was already brought up in preparation for the crackdown, and it loomed large in state-controlled coverage of the events.
The two cases also display some differences in terms of the frames employed. In Uzbekistan, the assertion of foreign influence even amounted to the claim that Taliban fighters were on the scene. Also, outlandish conspiracy theories and allegations of radicalism were unique to Uzbekistan. In Egypt, by contrast, anarchy and the disruption of normal life through the week-long occupation of a public square were prominent narratives. Furthermore, the rhetorical reference to the legality of repressive means was common, and new legislation was passed as the new regime imposed its own rules and sought legitimacy through legality. 
Sources of Learning and the International Context
It is impossible to understand the prominent role terrorism assumed in the discourses of both countries without taking into account the diffusion of "war on terror" rhetoric and practices, as epitomised in the countries' vague laws for dealing with terrorism. Both Egypt and Uzbekistan had already had already used terrorism discourses, and could thus exploit their own knowledge and routines. Together with previous collaboration with the United States in "fighting terror," this experience may have encouraged both governments to further expand this discourse -for example, to write it into the constitution as a state goal or promote it internationally, as al-Sisi did.
Furthermore, the respective regional neighbourhoods offered negative examples that were exploited rhetorically to validate the need for repression. To some extent, these cases of civil war and popular upheaval influenced the elite's threat perceptions, while they were also instrumentalised as justifications for harsh measures. Regarding civil war, Tajikistan served as a cautionary tale for Uzbekistan, while Egypt was able to choose from a range of violent conflicts in the region, including those in Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Both governments were able to point to the increasing challenge of jihadism, withholding the fact that the practices of authoritarian rulers were the dominant initial cause of the conflict in these neighbouring When it comes to understanding the different justifications detected in our analysis, the divergent international partners play an important role. China and Russia, as major authoritarian powers with a communist past, are geographically proximate and have close linkages to Uzbekistan. Thus, we see Russia backing Uzbek discourses or the diffusion of the Chinese frame of the "three evils." While Uzbekistan also cooperated closely with the United States on security issues, Egypt's relations to the United States are less balanced by other great powers. Accordingly, Egypt has long been sensitised to follow a certain discourse on the rule of law and human rights.
Domestic Context
Other differences did not result from international linkages, but rather from the specific domestic context. The fact that foreign influence was used to frame Uzbek but not Egyptian The differences in regime phase -that is, the timing of repression in Egypt immediately following a coup, as well as the fact that society had been politically mobilised in the previous years and witnessed various regime transformations -had little impact on the discourses.
Based on this finding, we hypothesise that terrorism and stability discourses are likely to be used under both extraordinary and "normal" conditions of contention.
In our cases, the diverging weight of security institutions did not play an important role, either with regard to discourses or to actual repression. Although in Uzbekistan the security services prevail and in Egypt the military is dominant, the general approach to repression and its justification are strikingly similar. Only in the details of the trials do we find differences resulting from the institutional set-ups, as well as from the broader legitimation discourse: in Uzbekistan, more emphasis was put on radicalism and conspiracies, whereas the Egyptian military, depicting itself as the guarantor of national and state security, stressed threats to state property and made multiple references to "the rule of law," something which has been a widespread discursive tool since President Sadat's rule.
Conclusion
This paper has highlighted the links between legitimation and repression by analysing the justifications of the crackdowns on mass protests in Egypt and Uzbekistan in 2013 and 2005, respectively. It has argued that examining the addressees of official discourses and the sources of learning are central to understanding the governmental framing of opponents and repressive events. We suggest that combining the current research on authoritarianism with the framing approach provides scholars with conceptual and theoretical tools to investigate the discourses of autocratic rulers at such critical points in time, while also taking international influences into account.
We have found that a mixture of domestic conditions and the international dimension of learning best illuminates the evolution of the frames employed in the cases of Egypt in 2013
and Uzbekistan in 2005. On the level of broad types of frames, the justifications offered for the crackdowns were very similar. In both countries, the security and stability of both the state and society were framed as the main endangered values, whereas protesters and the groups they were allegedly affiliated with were accused of criminal behaviour, terrorism, extremism, violence, and disruption. The allegations brought forward corroborate Dukalskis's (2015) findings from other cases. A status-quo-preserving master frame was plausible in Uzbekistan after decades of Karimov's rule, while in post-coup Egypt, the same master frame was indicative of the dire need to consolidate military rule. Although the rulers in both coun-299/2017 GIGA Working Papers tries feared political protest by large masses of citizens, the threats they claimed to face tied in with the global diffusion of the "war on terror" discourse. The terrorism frame is not a universal tool -it was notably not used after the Tiananmen Square massacre (Vuori 2003) - but it seems to be a popular justification in the current century. International diffusion effects apparently play a large role in the choice of the general direction of frames.
Looking at the more specific justification frames, including differences between the Uzbek and the Egyptian case, there are indications that the domestic audience and domestic sources have a large impact. This could be because this kind of broader framing is embedded in the respective regime's legitimation strategies. When it comes to the more fine-grained details of the framing, the international audience appears to also become important. The "fine-tuning"
can be regarded as a second step in the elites' discourse strategy where they consider additional audiences and potential negative reactions from the international sphere. For example, the stronger Egyptian focus on legality was to some extent directed towards a Western audience, whereas the foreign interference frame that was prominent in Uzbekistan echoed narratives prevailing in its regional surroundings.
Our findings also help to test and refine theoretical arguments on the international factors stabilising authoritarian rule. Large-scale repression events are often unprecedented situations; therefore, investigating their justifications constitutes a least likely case for demonstrating learning. Once more, learning from abroad is triggered by geographical and system proximity, as epitomised by the negative Kyrgyz example. In the absence of sufficient proximity, we do not find discourse convergence. Linkages to authoritarian great powers through regional organisations were used to underscore regime discourses and resolve isolation on the international scene.
The framing of protesters and Islamist movements as threats to security is a highly relevant topic in need of further empirical investigation. The two case studies would merit an even more detailed comparison. While we have illuminated the contents of frames in Egypt and Uzbekistan, more in-depth study could compare the framing situations and forms, possibly focusing on which rhetorical patterns dominate in which situations and how the dynamics of the interaction with opponents unfold.
Another path worth pursuing would be to examine the effects of the legitimation of repression. On the international level, the impact could be measured as military support or, if resonance is low, sanctions and counter-framing. In the domestic sphere, the mobilising and radicalising effects, as well as counter-framing, represent an important area to study. Harsh repression has often led to the radicalisation of some, turning false accusations into selffulfilling prophecies. Besides the effects on the persecuted persons, the frames' (non-) resonance with the audience would be also a crucial topic of study. The counter-framing by opposition activists indicates that the question of where the "real" threat to security comes from is highly contested. In his song about the events in Andijon, Uzbek poet Dadaxon
Hasanov sang: "We know who the terrorist is" (Kendzior 2007: 325) .
